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Abstract
Nonhuman animals steeply discount the future, showing a preference 
for small, immediate over large, delayed rewards [1–5]. Currently un-
clear is whether discounting functions depend on context. Here, we 
examine the effects of spatial context on discounting in cotton-top tam-
arins (Saguinus oedipus) and common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), 
species known to differ in temporal discounting [5]. We presented sub-
jects with a choice between small, nearby rewards and large, distant 
rewards. Tamarins traveled farther for the large reward than marmo-
sets, attending to the ratio of reward differences rather than their ab-
solute values. This species difference contrasts with performance on a 
temporal task in which marmosets waited longer than tamarins for the 
large reward. These comparative data indicate that context influences 
choice behavior, with the strongest effect seen in marmosets who dis-
counted more steeply over space than over time. These findings paral-
lel details of each species’ feeding ecology. Tamarins range over large 
distances and feed primarily on insects, which requires using quick, 
impulsive action. Marmosets range over shorter distances than tama-
rins and feed primarily on tree exudates, a clumped resource that re-
quires patience to wait for sap to exude [6–9]. These results show that 
discounting functions are context specific, shaped by a history of eco-
logical pressures.
Results and Discussion
Tradeoffs between smaller, immediate gains and larger, 
delayed rewards are ubiquitous for both humans and nonhu-
man animals (hereafter, animals) [10, 11]. Many animal spe-
cies highly discount the future, devaluing rewards by 50% in 
the first few seconds of delay [1–3, 5, 12, 13].
Animal discounting stands in stark contrast to human dis-
counting, where subjects wait for weeks, months, and years 
[10, 14]. In these experiments, however, subjects often chose 
between hypothetical monetary rewards over hypothetical 
timeframes (e.g., “Would you prefer to receive $50 now or 
$2000 in three years?”). Experiments that more closely mimic 
the animal foraging tasks by offering real monetary rewards 
and making subjects wait for real time delays show much more 
impulsive choices in humans [15]. This implies that the exper-
imental context in which discounting choices are framed can 
directly influence decision making.
Few studies have examined the effect of context on dis-
counting behavior in animals (but see [4, 16–19]). Here, we 
examine the role of context by comparing choice preferences 
in different types of discounting tasks: temporal and spatial.
In previous research on temporal discounting, we offered 
cotton-top tamarins and common marmosets choices between 
a small food reward available immediately and a larger re-
ward available after a time delay [5]. Results showed that mar-
mosets waited significantly longer for the larger reward, sug-
gesting that they discounted the temporal delay less steeply 
than tamarins. In the current task, we assessed these spe-
cies’ spatial discounting levels by presenting subjects with a 
choice between a smaller, closer reward and a larger, more 
distant reward. This choice maps onto natural foraging deci-
sions frequently faced by animals: consume the few remain-
ing food items nearby or travel to locate an untapped patch re-
plete with food [20, 21]. We placed the close reward 35 cm 
from the starting position and placed the distant reward at one 
of seven distances, ranging from 35 to 245 cm away (Figure 
1). With this design, we characterized how both species de-
value food rewards as a function of travel distance. If context 
does not affect discounting, then we should find the same pat-
tern observed in the temporal discounting experiment. Be-
cause the time to receiving the reward is proportional to the 
distance traveled, the more patient marmosets should also 
prefer to travel farther. If, however, context does influence dis-
counting in these primates (as it can in humans [15, 22–24]), 
spatial discounting preferences may differ from temporal dis-
counting preferences.
The magnitude of the reward also influences discounting 
decisions. Models predict that the ratio between reward val-
ues, and not the absolute magnitude of those rewards, should 
determine discounting patterns [1, 25, 26]. Discounting stud-
ies in pigeons and rats support these predictions: varying the 
magnitude of rewards does not influence discounting levels 
[3, 27, 28] (but see [29, 30] for possible exceptions). In con-
trast, humans seem to discount small rewards more highly 
than large rewards [14, 31, 32]. We tested for magnitude ef-
fects by offering our subjects two sets of numerical contrasts. 
Subjects chose between either one close and three far food 
pellets in one condition or two close and six far pellets in an-
other condition. Therefore, we maintained the 1:3 ratio of the 
reward amounts but varied their absolute magnitudes, allow-
ing us to assess whether these monkeys ignore magnitude, as 
demonstrated by other animals, or discount differently over dif-
ferent magnitudes like humans.
When we presented both rewards at the shortest distance 
(increment one), subjects (pooled over species) chose the 
large reward in 96.1% ± 1.5% (mean ± SEM) of the trials but 
only chose it in 68.8% ± 8.0% of the trials when we placed the 
large reward at the farthest distance (increment seven). The 
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distance to the large reward significantly affected the subject’s 
probability of choosing the large reward (repeated-measures 
ANOVA: F5,32 = 5.35, p < 0.01). Subjects reduced their pref-
erences for the large reward when placed farther away from 
them. However, a species difference appears to drive this dis-
tance effect. The two species tended to differ in their over-
all preference for the large reward, although this difference 
did not reach statistical significance (F1,6 = 4.42, p = 0.08). 
There was, however, a significant interaction between species 
and distance (F5,33 = 3.43, p = 0.01). Marmosets selected the 
larger reward less at the farthest distances (increments six and 
seven) relative to the closest distance (increment one), but 
tamarins were equally likely to choose the larger reward at all 
distances (Bonferroni posthoc tests, p < 0.05). Thus, marmo-
sets selected the larger reward less frequently as a function of 
increasing distance, whereas tamarins maintained their prefer-
ences for the large reward independently of distance (Figure 
2). Further analyses and a follow-up experiment suggest that 
neither satiation nor visual discrimination differences can ac-
count for this pattern (see the Supplemental Data available at 
the end of this article).
The marmosets’ relative preference for near contrasts with 
their ability to wait longer than tamarins for the large reward 
in the temporal discounting task [5]. This reversal could oc-
cur because tamarins travel faster than marmosets, there-
fore requiring less time to receive the large reward. To inves-
Figure 1. Experimental Apparatus
(A) Both tamarins and marmosets traveled to receive their rewards in a plexiglas enclosure.
(B) The food rewards were lined up in an array on a ledge in the box, each piece ~1 cm apart.
(C) Food boxes were placed at one of seven distances (35–245 cm) from the front of the enclosure. A wall was placed behind the far box.
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tigate this possibility, we measured the time required to travel 
to the closest and farthest rewards in follow-up sessions (see 
Supplemental Data). Overall, tamarins ran to the boxes in less 
time than the marmosets (F1,6 = 10.38, p = 0.02), and this dif-
ference depended on distance (F1,6 = 15.93, p < 0.01): tam-
arins traveled to the farthest rewards faster than the marmo-
sets (planned comparison, F1,6 = 15.15, p < 0.01; Figure 3). 
Although marmosets did take longer than tamarins to reach 
the farthest reward, their travel times were nonetheless much 
shorter than the intervals that marmosets waited in the tempo-
ral discounting task. For temporal discounting, tamarins waited 
an average of 7.9 s for six food pellets whereas marmosets 
waited an average of 14.4 s [5]. To more quantitatively assess 
whether temporal discounting can account for the species dif-
ference in preferences, we used the hyperbolic discounting 
equation
                               
V =
     A
                                      1 + kt
(where V = subjective value of a reward, A = reward amount, 
k = discount factor, and t = time delay to receiving the reward 
[33]) to estimate a discounting factor for each species with the 
data from the temporal discounting experiment (see Supple-
mental Data). When we analyzed these discounting factors 
along with the travel times in the spatial discounting experi-
ment, we found that these temporal discounting factors pre-
dicted complete preference for the more distant reward. Thus, 
we conclude that factors beyond those imposed by temporal 
discounting influenced the spatial discounting of marmosets. 
Though the marmoset results are inconsistent with tempo-
ral discounting alone, we cannot rule out an exclusive effect 
of temporal discounting on tamarins’ preferences. Further 
data are needed to clarify the role of time in tamarin spatial 
preferences.
To determine whether reward magnitude influences tam-
arin and marmoset discounting, we compared sessions in 
which subjects chose between one and three pellets to those 
in which they chose between two and six pellets. Subjects 
showed no significant difference in preference for the larger 
Figure 2. Effect of Species and Distance 
on Choice.
Tamarins maintained their preference for the 
large reward across all distances, whereas 
marmosets reduced their preference for the 
large reward as the distance to large in-
creased. Error bars represent standard error 
of the mean.
Figure 3. Effect of Species and Distance on Running Time
Tamarins and marmosets took the same amount of time to travel to 
the short distance (increment one, 35 cm). Tamarins, however, traveled 
to the farthest distance (increment seven, 245 cm) significantly faster 
than marmosets. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.


































reward across the two magnitude conditions (F1,6 = 1.55, p = 
0.26). There was also no significant interaction between mag-
nitude and distance (F5,29 = 1.50, p = 0.22) or between magni-
tude and species (Figure 4—F1,6 = 0.03, p = 0.88). Therefore, 
changes in absolute magnitude did not influence discounting 
in these monkeys when the ratio between rewards remained 
constant.
Space and Time
Faced with the same sets of decisions between smaller, 
closer rewards and larger, more distant rewards, tamarins 
traveled farther for rewards than marmosets. Whereas mar-
mosets reduced their preference for the large reward at the 
farthest distances (210–245 cm), tamarins did not discount at 
these distances. This demonstrates a reversal from the previ-
ous findings in which marmosets waited longer in a temporal 
discounting task [5]. Because the tamarins did not discount 
over these distances, we cannot determine whether spatial 
context in particular and context more generally affect their 
discounting. However, both the disparity between the marmo-
sets’ preferences in these two tasks and a quantitative anal-
ysis of their temporal discounting levels imply that context in-
fluenced their decision making—spatial discounting was not 
equivalent to temporal discounting. As a result, something in 
addition to time must have played a role in their spatial dis-
counting decisions.
Two other factors may account for the observed differ-
ences: energetic costs of traveling and predation risk. Models 
of temporal discounting behavior that take only reward quan-
tity and time delays into account may make good approxima-
tions of animal choice, because the metabolic cost of waiting 
for a food reward to appear may be negligible. However, when 
animals must actively work to obtain food, the associated en-
ergetic costs are no longer trivial. For example, European star-
lings (Sturnus vulgaris) adjusted their preference to account 
for both the gain associated with rewards and the travel cost 
of obtaining those rewards by means of walking as opposed 
to flying [16]. Additionally, brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) demonstrated a rapid decrease in preferences for dis-
tant rewards, perhaps due to energetic costs of movement as 
well as temporal aspects of intake rate [20, 21]. It is likely that 
tamarins and marmosets also include the energetic costs of 
traveling in their spatial discounting decisions.
Concerning predation risk, Waite [17] found that gray jays 
(Perisoreus canadensis) were more reluctant to retrieve a 
large food reward deep inside a tube when they previously 
had to travel only halfway into the tube for the same reward 
amount. Waite interpreted this result as a reflection of the in-
creased predation risk associated with traveling farther into 
the tube. Although the tamarins and marmosets in our study 
were all born in captivity, they have observed free-flying rap-
tors outside of their colony room and have experienced direct 
exposure to approaches by a trained Northern goshawk (Ac-
cipiter gentiles) (A. Palleroni, C. Sproul, and M.D.H., unpub-
lished data). Consequently, they might have perceived a po-
tential predation risk when entering our apparatus.
Our results suggest that, at least in marmosets, discount-
ing behavior is context specific: they will wait for food lon-
ger than tamarins but will not travel as far. A major selective 
force that underlies foraging decisions is ecological context. 
Previously, we ascribed the differences in tamarin and mar-
moset temporal discounting to ecological pressures and, in 
particular, aspects of their feeding behavior [5] (see [34] for 
a similar argument for memory differences in other tamarin 
and marmoset species). A key difference between the two 
species is the primary food items in their diet: tamarins spe-
cialize on insects, whereas marmosets specialize on gum 
and sap exuding from trees [6–9]. This difference in forag-
ing ecology aligns with the temporal discounting results: tam-
arins primarily consume an ephemeral food source that re-
quires impulsive action, whereas marmosets prefer to feed 
on a food source that requires scratching tree bark and then 
patiently waiting for sap to exude. These foraging differences 
may also account for ranging differences between species 
[9]. Because tamarins feed on an ephemeral, dispersed food 
source, they travel through large territories to find insects. 
Marmosets, however, feed on a localized, immobile food 
source and, consequently, face little pressure to travel long 
distances for food [9]. As a result, the territory sizes of these 
species are nonoverlapping, with tamarins averaging 7.8–10 
ha and marmosets 0.5–5 ha [7, 8]; moreover, tamarins travel 
farther on a daily basis (1700 m) than marmosets (700 m) 
[35, 36]. As such, these two discounting tasks may actually 
trigger different discounting strategies in the two species and 
reflect the innate preferences each species has for one for-
aging mode over the other.
Although our data are consistent with the foraging ecology 
hypothesis, we cannot completely exclude other hypotheses. 
It is possible that foraging ecology has shaped the cost/benefit 
functions of the species, such that these species differ in their 
Figure 4. Effect of Species and Reward Magnitude on Choice
Neither tamarins nor marmosets altered their preferences for the 
larger reward when choosing between one and three pellets or be-
tween two and six pellets. Therefore, they maintained their prefer-
ences for the same ratio of rewards but ignored absolute magnitude. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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travel costs or predation risk and, therefore, have different op-
timal strategies. Alternatively, other differences between these 
species may account for our results, such as general activity 
level, muscle mass, limb length, or basal metabolic rate. How-
ever, gummivory is a very powerful selective force that has led 
to adaptive specializations in tooth morphology and digestive 
physiology in marmosets [6, 37]. The far-reaching effects of 
gummivory on other aspects of physiology and behavior are 
difficult to disentangle from other selective forces.
Reward Magnitudes
Reward magnitude does not appear to influence tamarin or 
marmoset preferences: both species discounted at the same 
rate regardless of whether they chose between one and three 
pieces of food or between two and six pieces of food. This 
corroborates previous studies of animal discounting levels in 
which there is no effect of magnitude on choice behavior [3, 
27, 28]. As of yet, only humans reliably demonstrate a magni-
tude effect in discounting tasks, discounting smaller rewards 
more highly than large rewards [14, 31, 32].
This divergence between the human and animal data may 
result from different methodologies used to study discount-
ing. Studies of human discounting use monetary rewards that 
are often hypothetical. As such, these rewards can be much 
larger than any feasible food reward. For example, in two stud-
ies that found a magnitude effect, one [14] titrated large money 
amounts ranging from $100 to $100,000 and the other [31] 
used reward amounts ranging up to $1,000,000. Thus, animals 
may not demonstrate a magnitude effect simply because the 
phenomenon in humans is an artifact of presenting extremely 
large reward quantities—quantities that are both impossible to 
offer animals in the laboratory, and unlikely to occur in the wild, 
including our own species’ early history.
Experimental Procedures
Experimental Design
Four cotton-top tamarins (three females and one male) and four 
common marmosets (two males and two females) of mixed experi-
mental history participated in this experiment. Each subject experi-
enced seven distance comparisons. For all distance comparisons, we 
placed the small reward one distance increment (35 cm) from the front 
of the enclosure and we placed the larger reward progressively far-
ther away from the subject on subsequent sessions. Initially, the dis-
tance to the larger reward was the same as the distance to the smaller 
reward (35 cm); in the next session, the larger reward was moved two 
distance increments (70 cm) away while the smaller reward remained 
at one distance increment. This process continued until the larger re-
ward was placed seven distance increments (245 cm) away, the total 
length of the enclosure (Figure 1C).
Subjects completed these seven distances for two reward magni-
tude comparisons: one versus three banana-flavored food pellets (Re-
search Associates 45 mg purified primate diet pellets) and two versus 
six food pellets. We counter balanced the order of presenting the two 
magnitude conditions across subjects.
Apparatus and Setup
We placed subjects in a small transport cage (30 × 30 × 30 cm) 
abutting the front of the large, plexiglas test enclosure (240 × 120 × 45 
cm). A transparent plexiglas door allowed the subjects to see into the 
enclosure. The enclosure consisted of opaque white walls and a trans-
parent plexiglas ceiling (Figure 1A). In addition, the enclosure had a 
movable back wall that we adjusted such that it was placed 70 cm be-
hind the far reward for distance increments one to six and 35 cm be-
hind the far reward for increment seven.
Trial and Session Procedures
The experimenter placed two black boxes (20 × 11 × 11 cm) that 
contained the food rewards in the enclosure (Figure 1B). We lined 
up the food rewards in an array on a ledge inside the box, each 
piece ~1 cm apart. After placing food in the boxes at the appropri-
ate distances, the experimenter waited 10 s for the subject to view 
the choices and then removed the door. After removing the door, the 
subject had one minute to leave the transport box and enter the ap-
paratus and then had 30 s to make a decision. As soon as the sub-
ject made a choice (by touching a pellet) in a free session, the exper-
imenter used a remote control to close the nonchosen reward box, 
eliminating the possibility of obtaining these food pellets. We trained 
subjects to return to the starting transport box after consuming their 
chosen reward.
For each distance, increment subjects first completed a forced-
choice session of eight trials. In these sessions, subjects received only 
one option per trial and thus gained experience with both distances 
and reward contingencies. We presented four smaller, closer reward 
trials and four larger, farther reward trials in randomized order. The fol-
lowing day, subjects completed a free-choice session of eight trials at 
the same distance increment in which we allowed them to choose be-
tween the two options. In both session types, we randomly assigned 
the side of the enclosure for larger and smaller rewards for each trial. 
Please see the Supplemental Data for further details on experimental 
methodology.
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Supplemental Results 
The Role of Time in Spatial Discounting
Because tamarins traveled to the rewards more quickly than mar-
mosets, the species’ differences in preferences could result from the 
differential time delay to accessing the reward. To examine whether 
temporal discounting could account for the observed difference, we 
calculated a discounting factor for each individual in the temporal dis-
counting experiment [S1] and tested whether using this discounting 
factor predicts preferences in the spatial task. We used the hyperbolic 
equation
                                            V =      A
                                                    1 + kt
(where V = subjective value of a reward, A = reward amount, k = indi-
vidual discount factor, and t = time delay to receiving the reward) as a 
model of subjective value in this analysis [S2]. By measuring indiffer-
ence points in the temporal experiment, we found the point at which 
the subjects valued the small, immediate and large, delayed rewards 
equally. Therefore, we can substitute our reward amounts and time de-
lays into the hyperbolic equation such that  
                                              2      =     6
                                           1 + kt1     1 + kt2
and solve for k for each individual. Because we used different indi-
viduals in the temporal and spatial experiments, we calculated the 
mean discount factor for each species (kmarmoset = 0.149, ktamarin = 
0.279) to use in the analysis of the spatial task. We then substituted 
these species discount factors and the times required to access the 
food rewards at different distances in the spatial task into the hyper-
bolic equation to calculate a subjective value for each option. Table S1 
illustrates the subjective value placed on the closest and farthest op-
tions, assuming that the subjects use only temporal discounting to de-
termine their choices. This analysis predicted that all subjects should 
value the more distant reward more than the closer reward. Though 
the tamarins do follow these predictions, the marmosets show reduced 
preference for the distant reward, suggesting that temporal discount-
ing alone cannot account for their preferences in the spatial task. How-
ever, because tamarins did not show indifference at the distances ex-
perienced in this apparatus, we cannot quantitatively assess the role 
of temporal discounting.
Satiation 
Another possible explanation for the species difference in spatial dis-
counting is differing levels of satiation. Although this account is diffi-
cult to eliminate without an explicit test (e.g., manipulating levels of sa-
tiation), we examined the choice pattern within a session to look for 
changes in choices over trials. If, for instance, marmosets stopped 
traveling to the far distances because of increasing satiation during 
a session, we would expect to see preferences for the larger reward 
to decline over trials. On the contrary, there was no strong effect of 
trial number (F7,33 = 2.13, p = 0.07), although there was a slight trend 
to prefer the large reward more often in later trials. Importantly, the 
lack of a species by trial interaction (F7,33 = 1.13, p = 0.37) implies 
that marmosets did not choose the smaller reward more than tamarins 
simply because they became satiated more quickly over the course of 
a session.
Visual Discrimination
If tamarins and marmosets have different abilities to visually discrimi-
nate objects, this could account for our spatial discounting effect. That 
is, if marmosets cannot distinguish the pellets at the far distances, 
they may prefer the close reward that they can easily distinguish. Re-
search on the anatomy of tamarin and marmoset eyes suggests that 
they have similar visual acuity. Specifically, common marmosets (Cal-
lithrix jacchus) have peak cone densities and eye diameters very simi-
lar to golden-handed tamarins (Saguinus midas) [S3, S4], a species of 
tamarin closely related to our cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). 
To examine species differences behaviorally, we conducted an-
other follow-up study in which we provided subjects with a choice be-
tween two versus six pellets at the farthest distance. We began by 
reacclimating subjects to sessions of the distance increment one com-
parison. Once subjects reliably chose the six pellets (nine or ten out 
of ten times for two consecutive sessions), we presented  them with 
a session of both rewards at intermediate distances (135 cm). Af-
ter passing one session at the intermediate distance, subjects  ad-
vanced to the test sessions in which they had to choose between two 
and six pellets both at the farthest distance increment (245 cm). Sub-
jects faced three sessions at the farthest distance. To force  subjects 
to make a choice at the start box, we separated the two options with 
an opaque plexiglas divider that ran lengthwise in the enclosure from 
110 cm to the end of the apparatus. We considered  passing the front 
of the divider on one of the sides as a choice.
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on the arcsine, 
square-root transformed proportion of choices for the large reward 
by using replicate as a within-subject factor and species as a be-
tween-subject factor (four marmosets and three tamarins). Our anal-
ysis showed no effect of species (F1,5 = 2.98, p = 0.14) or replicate 
(F2,10 = 2.78, p = 0.11), suggesting that both species could discrim-
inate the rewards equally. Additionally, both marmoset and tamarins 
preferred the large reward at levels above chance (marmosets: 72.5% 
± 6.6%, t = 3.42, p = 0.04; tamarins: 85.6% ± 4.0%, t = 8.86, p = 0.01). 
This task, combined with the anatomical similarities, suggests that 
these two species should possess similar visual discrimination abili-
ties. Thus, differences in discrimination cannot account for the species 
differences in spatial discounting. 
Supplemental Experimental Procedures
Subjects
Four cotton-top tamarins (three females and one male) and four com-
mon marmosets (two males and two females) of mixed experimental 
history participated in this experiment. Three tamarins and three mar-
mosets had prior experience in a temporal discounting experiment [1]. 
Relative to the marmosets, which have only been  tested on the tem-
poral discounting experiments and a few studies  of auditory percep-
tion, the tamarins have been exposed to a wide  diversity of experi-
ments on tool use, cooperation, call perception,  language processing, 
and number representation [S5–S9].
Subjects received their daily food allotments after the experiments 
were completed at the end of the day. Both tamarins and marmosets 
were maintained at body weights that provided the most reliable per-
formance in food-motivated tasks (about 90% free-feeding weight); 
these weights approximate those observed in the wild. This  experi-
ment was approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Commit-
tee at Harvard University (Animal Subjects Codes 92-16 and 22-07).
Training
All subjects completed two phases of training prior to beginning this 
experiment. In the first phase, subjects habituated to the enclosure 
and reliably walked to the boxes to eat. In the second phase, sub-
jects demonstrated a preference for the larger reward over the smaller 
reward when the distance to both was equal (one distance unit). 
Subjects had to complete two consecutive sessions choosing the 
smaller reward no more than once. 
Supplemental Data
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Trial Setup 
Before starting each individual trial, the experimenter placed the food 
in the reward boxes (in random order for each trial) and moved the 
boxes to the appropriate distances. Both food rewards were loaded at 
the front of the apparatus (at one distance increment from the front of 
the enclosure), and the larger reward was then moved the farther dis-
tance. This ensured that subjects had visual access to both food re-
wards at an equal distance. In addition, food rewards remained visible 
to subjects throughout the trial even at the farthest distance. In forced 
trials only one option was available; the second box remained closed 
and placed at the appropriate distance.
Session Order
All subjects experienced seven distance increments for two magni-
tude comparisons for a total of 14 experimental sessions in which they 
could freely choose between the two options (free-choice sessions of 
eight trials each). In addition, subjects experienced a forced- choice 
session on the day preceding each free-choice session (also with eight 
trials each). So, for example, some subjects started off with a forced-
choice session of one pellet at distance-1 versus three pellets at dis-
tance-1, followed the next day by a free-choice session of the same. 
The following day, they faced a forced-choice session of one pellet at 
distance-1 versus three pellets at distance-2, then a free-choice ses-
sion at the same distances the next day. This pattern continued until 
they completed all seven distances. After a break of usually 5–14 days 
(one subject experienced a break of 30 days and another experienced 
a break of about 80 days), subjects started over at distance one with 
the other reward magnitude. Half of the subjects started with one ver-
sus three pellets and half started with two versus six pellets.
Aborts and Session Passing Criteria 
Subjects had to meet a number of criteria for a session’s data to be 
considered acceptable. If subjects aborted on a given trial, then  an 
additional trial was added to the end of the session to bring the com-
pleted trial number to eight. If a subject aborted more than two times, 
then we stopped the session, starting afresh on another day. Three 
behaviors resulted in an aborted trial in all session types: (1) failing to 
make a decision in the allotted time constraints (see procedure), (2) 
failing to eat the chosen food reward (subjects could leave no more 
than one piece of food for all rewards quantities greater than one), or 
(3) running past the farthest reward without choosing either option. All 
experimenters were trained on these coding methods before running 
a subject. 
In addition, subjects had to meet passing criteria in forced sessions 
in order to progress to the free-choice session. In forced trials, sub-
jects were required to travel in a direct path to the one available food 
reward; if subjects moved toward the closed, unavailable reward box 
before attempting to eat the available option, then the trial was consid-
ered incorrect. In forced sessions, subjects had to correctly complete 
at least seven out of eight trials for the session to count. If they failed 
to do so, they repeated the forced session. In free-choice sessions, all 
decisions were considered correct, assuming subjects did not abort. 
However, in order to ensure that subjects’ choices were not driven by 
a side bias toward one half of the apparatus, all free sessions in which 
subjects chose the food reward on one particular side seven or more 
times were discarded,  and the condition was repeated.
Time Duration Coding
In order to assess whether subjects’ decisions in this discounting task 
were driven by simple rate maximization, subjects completed four fol-
low-up sessions after they had completed the main experiment. Spe-
cifically, subjects completed a forced session at the longest distance 
(that is, one versus seven distance increments) for both magnitude 
comparisons. We used these sessions to estimate how long it took 
subjects to travel the longest and shortest distances they were tested 
on over the course of the experiment. Two independent coders scored 
the forced trials for two temporal  measurements: (1) travel time—to-
tal time spent moving toward the  box from when the subject left the 
transport box to when they  reached the chosen reward box and 
stopped moving (time during which the subject paused while travel-
ing was not included in this  measurement)— and (2) handling time—
time spent eating the reward (from when the subject reached the re-
ward box and no longer moved forward toward the box to when they 
put the last piece of  food in their mouth). The two coders were 96.1% 
and 99.7% correlated on these measures, respectively.
One outlier trial was excluded from this analysis, because a mar-
moset took an exceptionally long time to run to the small reward; her 
running time was more than seven standard deviations from the mean. 
This trial was removed from all time analyses.
Statistical Analysis
We analyzed the data with a series of repeated-measures analyses 
of variance. In the first analysis, we used reward magnitude (one ver-
sus three and two versus six) and distance-to-large (seven distances) 
as within-subjects factors and species as a between-subjects factor. A 
second analysis looked for changes over the course of a session, us-
ing trial number as a within-subjects factor (eight trials) and species 
as a between-subjects factor. We arcsine, square-root transformed 
the proportion choosing the larger reward in each free-choice session 
(eight trials per session) for each subject to normalize the data. We 
completed two more analyses for timing data on the follow-up exper-
iment. One assessed the effect of distance (35 versus 245 cm) and 
species on travel time; the second examined the effect of total pellet 
number (one, two, three, or six) and species on travel time. In all anal-
yses, we used the Huynh-Feldt correction when assumptions of ho-
mogeneity of variance were violated [S10]. We used Bonferroni pro-
cedures to test multiple comparisons of means in the within-subjects 
design, and we report the pairwise comparisons with p ≤ 0.05 [S11].
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